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Abstract: 
Are some things easier to deliberately forget than others? We will propose that the answer to this question is yes 
and that the kinds of things easier to forget may provide important clues as to how intentional forgetting occurs. 
Such efforts are timely because there has been increasing interest in directed forgetting as part of a broader 
trend toward investigating inhibitory abilities. To date, published research has not addressed how recallability of 
an item influences the magnitude of directed forgetting—that is, if some things are easier to remember, how 
does the ease of remembering influence the magnitude of deliberate forgetting? 
 
Article: 
The current article seeks to explore the theoretical mechanisms of one of the two most frequently-used directed 
forgetting paradigms: list-method directed forgetting (invented by R. A. Bjork, LaBerge, & LeGrand, 1968). In 
the list method, participants encode two lists of items. Between the lists, some participants are told to try to 
forget everything up to that point. Typically, directed forgetting has a dual effect on memory; compared with a 
remember control group that is not told to forget anything, the forget group shows impaired recall of List 1 
items (known as the costs) but enhanced recall of List 2 items (known as the benefits). 
Directed forgetting is not caused merely by withholding responses in the forget group, because monetary 
incentives to recall additional information do not elicit better recall (MacLeod, 1999), nor does the procedure 
completely erase the items from memory, because recognition tests and indirect memory tests do not show 
directed forgetting, suggesting that the items are available in memory but are simply inaccessible (Basden et al., 
1993; E. L. Bjork & Bjork, 1996). Directed forgetting has also been observed in incidental learning (Geiselman, 
Bjork, & Fishman, 1983; Sahakyan & Delaney, 2005), suggesting that pure rehearsal-based explanations are 
insufficient to explain the phenomenon. Consequently, some researchers proposed that directed forgetting 
involves an inhibitory process (E. L. Bjork & Bjork, 1996; R. A. Bjork, 1989). According to this view, an 
inhibitory mechanism is invoked at the time of retrieval that reduces access to unwanted memories, producing 
lower recall of List 1 items (the costs of directed forgetting). Because List 1 items are less accessible, they are 
correspondingly less likely to interfere with List 2 items, producing the benefits of directed forgetting (e.g., E. 
L. Bjork & Bjork, 1996). 
An alternative account suggests that directed forgetting is a context effect (Sahakyan, 2004; Sahakyan & 
Kelley, 2002). Our interpretation of the directed forgetting effect was inspired by the search of associative 
memory (SAM)/retrieving effectively from memory (REM) memory models (e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; 
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Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997) and their variants (e.g., Mensink & Raaijmakers, 1988). Like many memory 
theories, these models distinguish between item information and context information. They assume that 
processing an item constructs an image in memory, which is an interconnected set of features that represents 
information about the item content (such as its lexical/semantic representation) and the context in which that 
item was learned. Typically, item content information is the focus of attention during study, whereas context 
information is more peripheral information referring to the physical, spatial–temporal, environmental, 
physiological, or emotional states in which the item was experienced (Murnane, Phelps, & Malmberg, 1999). 
During recall, a person assembles a set of retrieval cues that are used to activate and select images in long-term 
memory—a process called sampling. The model samples images, and whenever an image is sampled, a separate 
recovery process attempts to retrieve information out of that image. Successful sampling does not necessarily 
guarantee successful recovery. In free recall, the first sampling attempt relies strictly on context cues. If an item 
is successfully recovered, then that item serves as an additional retrieval cue (along with the context cues) to 
guide subsequent retrieval attempts. However, if the attempt to recall was unsuccessful, then context cues alone 
continue to guide search. The success of the context cue when accessing relevant images in long-term memory 
depends on the overlap between context at the time of storage and the test context. 
Given the importance of context cues in free recall, Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) proposed a context-based 
explanation for directed forgetting. They suggested that forget instructions encourage establishing a new mental 
context for List 2 encoding. One strategy for deliberately forgetting List 1 would be to stop maintaining the 
contextual elements that were present at the time of List 1 encoding and instead sample new contextual cues for 
List 2. For example, the forget instruction may induce some people to deliberately think of something unrelated 
to the experiment, leading to changes in mental context between the two lists. At the time of final recall, the 
context cues will match the List 2 learning context better than the List 1 context, producing forgetting of List 1 
items. Recall is poorer when there is a low correspondence between the context at the time of the study and test 
(see Smith & Vela, 2001, for a meta-analysis of experimental findings on context-dependent forgetting). 
Empirical support for the context-based explanation of directed forgetting came from studies that produced 
effects similar to directed forgetting without instructing people to forget but, instead, by engaging participants 
in a diversionary thought intended to change their mental context between the two lists (Sahakyan & Delaney, 
2003; Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002). 
If directed forgetting costs arise from a context mismatch between study and test, then items that are more 
strongly linked to List 1 context should be more forgettable when context changes (as in the Forget condition). 
Imagine two events (A and B) that were experienced in the same context, but Event A was more strongly linked 
to that context than was Event B. When context is used as a retrieval cue during recall, it will be a better cue for 
A than for B. However, if context changed between the study and test, it should impair retrieval of A more than 
that of B. Therefore, directed forgetting should hurt items that were more strongly linked to List 1 context more 
than items that were weakly linked to List 1 context. 
To examine this hypothesis, one needs to know what strengthens the relationship between an item and its 
context as well as what simply increases item strength without enhancing context storage. Malmberg and 
Shiffrin (2005), building on SAM/REM, suggested that a fixed amount of context information is stored when an 
item is first studied. Extra study time and/or deeper processing do not substantially enhance the storage of 
context information; they merely increment the item strength. In contrast, spaced presentations of the study 
items strengthen both item information and context information. Their conclusions were based on the presence 
or absence of the list-strength effect (LSE) in memory. While a list of strong items is recalled better than a list 
of weak items, the recall difference between strong and weak items is even larger when they appear on the same 
list—known as the LSE (Ratcliff, Clark, & Shiffrin, 1990; Tulving & Hastie, 1972). In SAM/REM, the LSE in 
free recall is attributed to a sampling advantage of items with more context storage. When context is used as a 
retrieval cue at the time of recall, images containing strong context become activated to a greater extent than 
images with weak context and are therefore sampled preferentially. Thus, on mixed lists there is a tendency to 
sample the strong images at the expense of sampling weaker images. The sampling difference is the cause of 
LSE in these models. Once an image is sampled, the item content features contained in that image determine the 
success of the recovery process. For example, on pure lists, the memory advantage of strong items over weak 
items is attributed to differences in the recovery process because the sampling of all images is approximately 
equivalent on pure lists. 
To summarize, in models like REM/SAM, the observation of the significant LSE implies that the study 
conditions must have enhanced the context strength, whereas the absence of LSE (despite the overall item 
strength effect on both mixed and pure lists) implies that context strength was not incremented by the study 
condition. Malmberg and Shiffrin (2005) found an LSE only for spaced repetitions, but not for other 
strengthening operations such as depth of processing or lengthening the study time. They concluded that each 
spaced presentation of the item leads to the storage of an additional ―shot‖ of context, but other varieties of 
strengthening, such as additional processing time or depth of processing, do not enhance the context storage but 
merely increment the item strength. They termed this the one-shot hypothesis of context storage. For a full 
description and the formal account of the one-shot hypothesis and the REM/SAM model, refer to Malmberg and 
Shiffrin (2005). 
Given the assumptions of the one-shot hypothesis, the context account of directed forgetting predicts that 
greater directed forgetting should be observed for strong items than for weak items when items are strengthened 
by an operation that produces an LSE (e.g., spacing). In contrast, strengthening manipulations that do not 
enhance context storage should lead to equivalent amounts of directed forgetting from strong and weak items. 
Therefore, in three experiments, we used different strengthening manipulations in conjunction with the list-
method directed forgetting design, where List 1 words consisted of strong items and weak items for each 
participant. 
Participants were instructed to perform judgments on two word lists and were told that their judgments would 
help create materials for a future study. Thus, words were encoded incidentally rather than intentionally. 
Incidental learning allows better experimental control over encoding manipulations because it circumvents 
rehearsal, which could redistribute study time inequitably across strong and weak items (e.g., Rundus, 1971). 
Additionally, some authors have suggested that directed forgetting costs arise partly from rehearsal differences 
between the forget and remember conditions (e.g., Benjamin, 2006; Sheard & MacLeod, 2005). Therefore 
obtaining directed forgetting with incidental learning would strengthen the argument that processes beyond 
selective encoding underlie directed forgetting. 
Elsewhere we have argued that the main cause of directed forgetting benefits in intentional learning is that 
participants in the forget group adopt more elaborate encoding strategies during List 2 learning compared with 
participants in the remember group (Sahakyan & Delaney, 2003). Given incidental learning procedures, we did 
not expect to observe the benefits because incidental encoding prevents encoding strategy changes between the 
lists and produces no benefits (Sahakyan & Delaney, 2005). 
Experiment 1: Depth of Processing  
In Experiment 1, we manipulated strength by varying the depth of processing; that is, strong words were 
encoded with an orienting task involving a pleasantness judgment, whereas weak words were encoded with an 
orienting task that involved determining whether the word contained letter E. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four University of North Carolina, Greensboro, undergraduates participated for course credit and reported 
not expecting a memory test in their final verbal reports. They were randomly assigned to the forget or control 
group. 
Materials 
Two lists of 16 medium-frequency nouns were created. Half of the List 1 words contained the letter E and half 
did not. List 1 was split into two blocks of 8 items that were encoded with the same orienting task (either 
pleasantness judgment or letter E). Blocked presentation was employed to avoid frequent task switching and 
floor recall of List 1 weak items. The presentation order of the strong versus weak blocks was counterbalanced. 
Also, each word was assigned to the pleasantness task or the letter E task equally often. On List 2, half of the 
words rhymed with the word seven and half did not. All List 2 items were encoded with the same orienting task 
involving rhyming. 
Procedure 
Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to design word norms for materials for a later 
experiment (cover stories are available on request). They were told that if a smiley-face icon appeared under a 
word, they were to indicate if it was pleasant or not (strong items), and if the letter E appeared under a word, 
they were to indicate if the word contained an E (weak items). Items were presented once at a rate of 4 s per 
word. 
After the first list, half of the participants were told that they would need to rate one more list (further termed 
the control group). The remaining participants were told to forget the first list before moving on to rate the 
second list (further termed the forget group). They were told,  
The list of words you just rated was the first list that we need to collect ratings for. Could you please rate one 
more list of words? However, it is really important that you not be influenced by your prior ratings. Therefore, 
please make an effort to try and forget those words and pretend you did not rate anything. Try not to think of the 
earlier words in order not to contaminate the judgments on these new items. 
Then the second list of 16 items was presented. List 2 words were judged for whether or not they rhymed with 
the word seven. The choice of the rhyming task was based on pilot testing because when both lists were 
processed with the same orienting task, the recall of the List 1 weak items was at floor. A surprise written free 
recall test was given afterwards on List 1, followed by List 2. Recall was carried out on separate sheets of paper 
for each list, with 90 s allotted for the recall of each list. After the memory test, participants were asked whether 
they suspected that their memory would be tested. 
Results 
The proportion of recalled List 1 words (including cross-list confusions) was submitted to a Cue (forget vs. 
control) × Item Strength (strong vs. weak) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA). There was a significant main 
effect of cue, F(1, 62) = 10.81, p < .01, MSE = .016, η
2
 = .15, indicating fewer List 1 items were recalled 
following a forget instruction (.29) than were recalled in the control condition (.37). Item strength was also 
significant, F(1, 62) = 195.79, p < .001, MSE = .022, η
2
 = .76, indicating that strong items were better recalled 
(.51) than weak items (.15). However, there was no interaction (F < 1; see Figure 1), indicating that both types 
of items were equally forgettable. There were also no significant differences in List 2 recall (F < 1; .30 in forget 
and .31 in control).  
 
 
Figure 1. Mean proportion List 1 recall (±SE) by cue and item strength in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2: Processing Time  
Experiment 2 varied strength by manipulating the processing time, with strong items processed for longer 
durations (two consecutive presentations) and weak items processed for shorter durations (single presentation). 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four University of North Carolina, Greensboro, undergraduates participated for course credit. None of 
these participants expected a memory test as indicated by the retrospective questioning. 
Materials 
Two new lists of 16 medium-frequency nouns composed the stimuli for Experiment 2. Four versions of List 1 
were created in order to counterbalance (a) whether a given word was presented once or twice and (b) whether 
the first word on the list was a once-presented word or a twice-presented word. Four more versions were created 
by exchanging the first four words of each type (once-presented or twice-presented) with the other four words 
of that type. A pleasantness judgment was performed on all items. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, except that words were rated only for pleasantness. Short 
processing times involved a single 4-s judgment of pleasantness. Long processing times involved two 
consecutive 4-s presentations with two judgments of pleasantness (for a total processing time of 8 s). 
Participants were warned in advance that some items may be presented twice and that they should make a 
separate judgment for each presentation so that we could track the reliability of their ratings. After rating List 1 
words, half of the participants were instructed to try to forget them with the instructions from the previous 
experiment. List 2 words were each presented for 4 s and were rated for pleasantness. Afterwards, a 90-s 
surprise recall test was given for List 1, followed by a 90-s recall of List 2 on separate sheets of paper. 
Results 
A Cue × Item Strength mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of item strength, F(1, 62) = 12.29, p < 
.01, MSE = .017, η
2
 = .17, indicating that strong items were better recalled (.37) than weak items (.29). There 
was also a significant main effect of cue, F(1, 62) = 5.29, p < .05, MSE = .032, η
2
 = .08, indicating that fewer 
List 1 items were recalled following a forget instruction (.29) than were recalled in the control condition (.37). 
However, there was no interaction (F < 1; see Figure 2), suggesting that both types of items were equally 
forgettable. There were no significant differences in List 2 recall (F = 1.00; .32 in forget and .31 in control).  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean proportion List 1 recall (±SE) by cue and item strength in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 3: Spacing  
In Experiment 3, strength of List 1 items was varied by spacing repetitions of words. Weak items were repeated 
twice consecutively (massed presentation), while strong items were repeated twice but with several other words 
in between the two repetitions (spaced presentation). 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 96 University of North Carolina, Greensboro, undergraduates participated for course credit. They 
were tested individually. Six participants were replaced because post-session questioning revealed that they 
expected a memory test. 
Materials 
Materials were the same as in Experiment 2. List 1 items were presented twice, with eight items presented 
through massed repetition and eight items through spaced repetition. Two types of judgments were performed 
on each word—one pleasantness judgment and one living/non-living judgment. Spaced items' first repetition 
occurred in the first half of List 1, and their second presentation was in the second half, with an average lag of 
12.5 items. Half of the massed items appeared in the first half of List 1, and the rest were in the second half of 
List 1. We created eight versions of the lists that fully counterbalanced (a) whether each word was presented as 
a spaced or a massed item, (b) whether the first word on the list was a massed or a spaced item, and (c) whether 
the first presentation of a word received a pleasantness judgment or a ―living/non-living‖ judgment; the second 
judgment was always the opposite. Eight additional versions of the lists were created by exchanging the first 
four words of each type (spaced or massed) with the other four words of that type. List 2 items were presented 
once, with half of the items encoded via pleasantness judgment and the remaining items with living/non-living 
judgment. 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 2, except that two different orienting tasks were performed on each 
word. Participants were told that words might appear more than once. If a smiley-face icon appeared under a 
word, they were to indicate if it was pleasant or not, and if a yin–yang icon appeared under a word, they had to 
indicate if it represented a living or non-living thing. All List 1 words were presented twice for 4 s each time. 
Every word was judged once on each dimension, with the order of the ratings counterbalanced. After rating List 
1 words, half of the participants were instructed to try to forget them with the instructions from the previous 
experiments. Then List 2 words were presented once for 4 s, with half of the words being rated for pleasantness 
and half for living/non-living. Afterwards, a 90-s surprise recall test was given for List 1, followed by a 90-s 
recall of List 2 on separate sheets of paper. 
Results 
A Cue × Item Strength mixed ANOVA on proportion List 1 recall revealed a significant main effect of item 
strength, F(1, 94) = 37.92, p < .001, MSE = .029, η
2
 = .29, confirming that strong items were better recalled 
(.51) than weak items (.36). There was also a significant main effect of cue, F(1, 94) = 9.17, p < .01, MSE = 
.032, η
2
 = .09, with fewer words recalled in the forget group (.40) than in the control group (.48). In addition, 
the interaction was significant, F(1, 94) = 4.97, p < .05, MSE = .029, η
2
 = .05, showing that there was 
significant directed forgetting of spaced items, t(94) = 3.95, p < .001, but not of massed items (t < 1; see Figure 
3). The lack of forgetting of massed items likely reflects reduced competition in the forget group—fewer strong 
items were available to compete with the recall of weak items than those in the control group, and hence weak 
items recovered. Finally, there were no significant differences in List 2 recall (F < 1; .27 in forget and .26 in 
control).  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean proportion List 1 recall (±SE) by cue and item strength in Experiment 3. 
General Discussion  
In three experiments, we evaluated the magnitude of directed forgetting following different strengthening 
manipulations. In each experiment, strong items were better recalled than weak items. Furthermore, while we 
obtained significant directed forgetting in all three experiments, we observed more forgetting of strong items 
than weak items only when strength was varied by spacing of presentations (Experiment 3). Depth of 
processing and longer study time led to equivalent amounts of directed forgetting (Experiments 1 and 2). Given 
the assumptions of the one-shot hypothesis, these results provide support for the context hypothesis of directed 
forgetting (Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002). 
The one-shot hypothesis of Malmberg and Shiffrin (2005) was motivated by differences in the LSE across 
various strengthening manipulations. As stated previously, SAM/REM memory models attribute LSE to context 
effects. An alternative explanation for the LSE was proposed by Bäuml (1997), who argued that the LSE arises 
from output order biases. Recalling strong items earlier in the output sequence leads to output interference, 
reducing recall of weak items. When Bäuml (1997) controlled output order in cued recall, LSE was eliminated, 
but when recall order was unrestricted an LSE emerged. Although the present studies used free recall rather 
than cued recall, we examined the output order because the results of Bäuml (1997) implied that output order 
could contribute to the LSE. 
We rank ordered the recall of strong and weak items in our experiments and calculated the average output 
percentile following the procedure recommended by R. A. Bjork and Whitten (1974). Smaller values of output 
percentile indicate earlier output in the recall sequence. For Experiment 3, we found that the control group 
recalled strong items earlier (.49) than weak items (.62), t(45) = 3.25, p < .01. However, in the forget group 
there was no significant difference in the output position of strong (.53) and weak items (.57; t < 1), implying 
that directed forgetting reduced the output order bias. This could be partly due to greater forgetting of strong 
items than weak items in the forget group in Experiment 3. Compared with the control condition, in the forget 
condition fewer strong items were available at the time of recall to cause output interference on weak items. 
Unlike in Experiment 3, in Experiment 2, there were no significant output order differences in the forget group 
(.58 for strong and .59 for weak) or in the control group (.57 for strong and .59 for weak; both ts < 1). Similarly, 
in Experiment 1, there were also no significant differences in the output order in either group, with the highest t 
value being 1.1. 
In Experiment 3—where the task manipulation enhanced the context strength—we observed an output bias 
favoring strong items in the control group. Otherwise, we observed no preference in output order in the 
remaining studies (despite having higher recall rates for strong items). If output order was mainly driven by the 
item strength, we should have observed a similar pattern of output order across all experiments, regardless of 
the item strengthening operation. However, this was not the case in the current studies. These results suggest 
that the bias in output order may be driven by context strength, such that items with more context storage tend 
to be recalled earlier. Although output biases could contribute to the LSE, the current results suggest that output 
biases may be driven by context strength. 
The results of these experiments have implications for the theoretical mechanisms of directed forgetting. Our 
position has been that the mechanism behind List 1 costs in directed forgetting involves mental contextual 
change. When participants receive the forget instruction, they stop maintaining List 1 context and instead 
encode List 2 items with new context cues. The context hypothesis of directed forgetting predicts that items that 
are strongly linked to their context will suffer more than items that are weakly linked to their context when 
context changes at the time of test. On the other hand, differences in the item strength alone would be 
insufficient to create differential amounts of directed forgetting for weak and strong items. The results of our 
experiments were fully consistent with these predictions. 
If different strengthening operations differentially influenced the magnitude of directed forgetting across strong 
and weak items, then we should expect a three-way interaction when Experiment is included as a variable in the 
analyses. However, only Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 utilized the same materials and orienting tasks, and 
they were also run in the same semester. Therefore, it was more appropriate to compare the results across these 
two studies, especially because the same items (massed items) acted as the strong items in Experiment 2 and as 
the weak items in Experiment 3. In Experiment 2, they were strong relative to once-presented items because of 
their greater item strength; in Experiment 3, they were weak relative to spaced items because of their lower 
context strength and item strength. A Cue (forget vs. control) × Item Strength (strong vs. weak) × Experiment 
(processing time vs. spacing) ANOVA on proportion List 1 recall revealed that the three-way interaction was 
approaching significance, F(1, 156) = 3.55, p = .06, suggesting that directed forgetting was driven by context 
strength. 
Throughout three experiments, we failed to observe enhanced List 2 recall in the forget condition (i.e., no 
benefits of directed forgetting). Because the reported studies utilized incidental learning, this null effect is 
consistent with Sahakyan and Delaney's (2005) finding that incidental learning did not lead to improved 
memory of post-cue items. In line with our previous research, the costs and the benefits of directed forgetting 
can be observed independently, suggesting that they likely have different underlying mechanisms. 
The results from the reported directed forgetting experiments paralleled the findings obtained with the LSE 
paradigm. Strengthening operations that produced LSE effects also produced differences in the magnitude of 
directed forgetting. In contrast, strengthening operations that produced null LSE produced no differences in the 
magnitude of directed forgetting across the manipulations of strength. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that context mediates directed forgetting. Furthermore, given the parallels between the LSE and directed 
forgetting, the list-method paradigm could provide a new tool for investigating the effects of context on 
memory. 
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